It needs also to be pointed out that our emerging elite ruling carbon priest class of UN cronies, Al Gores, Rothchilds and Rockefellers are one and the same.

Once the majority fully psychologically buy into the mentality of serving the earth via the elite it’s game over dark ages time.

We need better quality money and credit but the jerks feel that they have to do the opposite. They busily try making band aids(more review mirror inspired regulations) to put on a cancer (bad money/lawless lack of property and contract) that they keep feeding.

I think they did very well but of course I was pushing the Austrian view, along with crowding out etc. I am now convinced there was a genuine boom. However, malinvestments can occur at the same time as worthy economic projects. This may have helped to pull the rug from under the carpet so to speak. Sectoral analysis would have also been good. The uncertainty factor of Smoot Hawley, money and fiscal policy also plays into the Austrian theory – no proper economic valuation could be made with so much uncertainty. Sure, there are risk quantifying procedures, but the policy was uncoordinated and the Fed was, as the author puts it, amorphous.

My take on the paper is that it identifies a global financial system and global trade system where the global trade system got a spanner thrown in it. This affected valuations and therefore financial flows, on top of the millstone of tariffs on the real economy.

I like this thesis.

I would still however back the idea of war financing through inflation as a major problem for the 1920s economy.

Furthermore, I think it is important to view the short run effects of monetary policy with fixed or sticky prices. A central bank and a fixed rate seem like a very volatile mix. The impact on slowly or never adjusting prices with rapid changes in money market liquidity can have large and serious impacts elsewhere.

In terms of your second point I’m not sure how this is relevant.